Limitation For Filing Application for setting aside Arbitral Award
Section 34(3) states that an application to set aside an arbitral award must be submitted by the arbitral tribunal within 3 months of receipt of the award or disposition of the application.
Section 36, which states that the award becomes enforceable as soon as the limitation period under Section 34 ends, forms an integral part of section 34(3). The proviso of Section 34(3) allows the party to file an application for a further period of 30 days
after the expiry of three months, given that the court is satisfied that the party has been stopped from submitting an application on fairgrounds. After the expiry of those extra thirty days, no appeal to set aside the award may be entertained by the court.
Proceedings were initiated before the Supreme Court in National Aluminum Co Ltd v. Presteel Fabrication (P) Ltd, under the mistaken assumption that it had jurisdiction to set aside the matter. The Supreme Court held that time spent on a bona fide prosecution of an application in an incorrect venue was an appropriate reason for condonation of delay.
In Union of India v. Shring Construction Co (P) Ltd, the award was often lost in a written court which was found not to be maintainable because the appellant had his remedy in the proceedings before the District Judge under Section 34. In addition to a motion for delay forgiveness, the District Judge was then confronted. He rejected it because it was time-barred. The Supreme Court ruled that, after removing the time spent in the wrong court, the District Judge should have determined if the appeal was time-barred.
The Delhi High Court noted in Union of India v. Microwave Communication Ltd that, contrary to Section 5, Section 4 'does not extend the limitation period but only allows the party to file any action, application, etc. on the Court's reopening day if the Court is closed on the day on which the limitation expires.' Since there was no overlap of any kind between Section 4 and Section 34(3), the Court held that Section 4 would apply in situations in which the applicant did not neglect due diligence. The Court also decided, curiously, that Section 4 was also applicable to cases where the proviso of Section 34(3) was drawn, i.e. the duration of condonation of thirty days.
A bare reading of Section 34(3) read with the proviso makes it abundantly clear that it would be appropriate to make an application within three months to set aside the award. The term may be further expanded by another period of thirty days, but not thereafter, on appropriate grounds to be shown. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that if a certain limitation period is prescribed by any special legislation, as well as provision for an extension up to a defined time limit, is shown on a sufficient basis, the limitation period prescribed by special lawshall prevail and, to that degree, the provisions of the Limitation Act shall be exempt.
Because of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Restriction Act are not applicable.
This Article Does Not Intend To Hurt The Sentiments Of Any Individual Community, Sect, Or Religion Etcetera. This Article Is Based Purely On The Authors Personal Views And Opinions In The Exercise Of The Fundamental Right Guaranteed Under Article 19(1)(A) And Other Related Laws Being Force In India, For The Time Being.